Defensive Behavior

Alarm bells are sounding anew for NATO. the allies rallied around after Sept. 11 but soon discovered the U.S. needed no help to smite its enemies in Afghanistan. Although British special forces joined the fray, “Thanks, but no thanks” was the message from U.S. commanders who, truth be told, didn’t want a bunch of Europeans second-guessing them. Besides, what could Europe bring to the shooting party? Where was Europe’s Rapid Reaction Force, its strategic airlift, its carrier battle groups?

As the world becomes a vastly more dangerous place, some worrisome trends first exposed in the Balkans are being confirmed. Post-cold war defense-spending cuts have left Europe without the military clout to contribute to regional let alone global security. The U.S., on the other hand, just gets stronger. Over the next five years, the largest increase in defense outlays since the Reagan era will see the Pentagon spending more than $2 trillion. Small wonder that Super Power envy — and fear — abounds.

The growing disparity between U.S. and European capabilities has profound implications. NATO has always grappled with the issue of “interoperability” — whether U.S. tanks, for example, can fire Belgian ammo. Such problems can only grow as the U.S. services deploy high-tech “next-generation” weapons and adapt their war-fighting doctrines accordingly. As Europe’s capabilities atrophy, dependence on America to do the dirty work will deepen. But dependence breeds resentment on both sides, and already in Europe voices can be heard decrying America’s go-it-alone interventionism. Across the Atlantic the notion of a feckless Europe unable and unwilling to share the security burden is taking hold. Europe talks loudly, it seems, but carries a very small stick.

When not complaining about Americans in “unilateralist overdrive,” the Europeans protest, with some justification, that the U.S. prefers peacemaking to peacekeeping. U.S. bombs and cruise missiles helped “pacify” the Balkans, but it is the Europeans who have the task of making sure the peace endures. Fair enough in Europe’s backyard, but not in Afghanistan — where Washington seems intent on bowing out of the process of “stabilizing” the country, the better to train its sites on the next target, Iraq.

Europeans who believe this division of labor is the way of the future should think again. Europe is closer than the U.S. to many of the world’s flashpoints and cannot afford to drop its military guard. Europe’s cash-strapped governments will never be able to match U.S. spending, but they can close the capability and credibility gap without mirror-imaging U.S. forces. These in any case waste billions on costly “legacy programs” designed for the cold war at the expense of transformational new weapon systems needed for future, more complicated conflicts. Smarter procurement would enable Europe to get more bang for the defense buck. The U.S. can afford to spend $350 billion on three new kinds of tactical fighter, but Europe should be shopping for drones that can carry out many of the tasks of unmanned aircraft at a fraction of the cost. Europe also needs to get its organizational act together. Every six months the E.U. has a new President who can come from the likes of tiny Luxembourg or neutral Ireland. Henry Kissinger once famously asked for Europe’s telephone number. It’s still unlisted. If Europe wants Washington to call, it must develop common and coherent foreign and defense policies backed by military power.

The U.S. also needs to take a hard look at its own defense posture. If capabilities are a reflection of intentions, then America appears to be bent on world domination. The benign view of the Bush buildup is that America needs large gestures following last September’s attacks. The cynical view is that he is “buying” votes in this mid-term election year. But whatever the reason, the combination of untrammeled U.S. economic and military power coupled with a new interventionist mood makes many allies nervous and resentful.

For this reason the U.S. must revisit other components of the global security equation. It is difficult to measure the amount of security that debt forgiveness or development aid can buy. But unless the world’s leading economy plays a larger role in redressing the global balance of prosperity, there will be fertile breeding ground aplenty for terrorists. And being the lone superpower will not buy security. “Let them hate so long as they fear” is not a viable modus operandi in a world in which the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is no great challenge. As the events of Sept. 11 showed, U.S. invincibility should not be confused with U.S. invulnerability.

In partnership with the E.U., the U.S. should augment its “hard defense” capabilities with “soft defense” to help bring about global uplift. Unlike the attack on Afghanistan, this course of action will not yield immediate, measurable results. It will not improve NATO defenses overnight. But it will help make NATO worth defending.