World: The Giant Bottleneck

The No. 1 U.S. problem in Viet Nam at the moment is not the war but the wherewithal to fight the war, not the Communist enemy but the beans and bread, bullets and billets necessary for the daily support of 170,000 American fighting men. Between the U.S. and its forces in the field lies a transport pipeline some 9,000 miles long. It flows freely until it hits the ports and beaches of South Viet Nam, where a dearth of deep-water piers, tugs, lighters and warehousing has created a bottleneck of giant and dangerous proportions.

Last week 92 cargo ships stood to in Viet Nam’s six major ports. Only 40 were being unloaded; the rest lay idly at anchor. Some 40 more are being held up in the Philippines, Okinawa and Japan until the traffic thins. With the U.S. buildup, incoming cargo has increased tenfold in half a year, to 800,000 tons last month—and 60% of it must pass through Saigon. The average wait for a ship to be unloaded is 22 days at Saigon, 31 at Cam Ranh Bay, 40 at Danang—though both Cam Ranh and Danang are rapidly being improved.

C-Rats & Spray. The bottleneck has not yet curtailed any major U.S. action in Viet Nam, but it has, as one officer puts it, “kept us in essentially a defensive position.” At the 1st Air Cav’s giant enclave at An Khe, Jeeps and trucks are only driven when absolutely necessary. The division is short of gas, while two huge ocean-going tankers loll in the Saigon River waiting to be unloaded. Last month the marines at Danang ran out of mosquito spray in the midst of a malarial epidemic that has forced the evacuation of 800 infected servicemen: 37,500 gallons were borrowed from other bases. Twice the U.S.S. Kimbro set sail for Viet Nam from the Philippines, only to be ordered back because of lack of dock space for its cargo of rockets, bombs and 175-mm. shells. Last week the ship finally made it, and just in time: the troops at Qui Nhon were running low on 175-mm. ammo.

An estimated 70% of the troops in Viet Nam are still eating canned C-rations (“C-rats” to the G.I.s), despite over 200,000 choice steaks and mountains of fresh eggs and vegetables waiting in Saigon’s cold-storage facilities. Reason: field units have inadequate refrigerated space of their own—a must in Viet Nam’s hot and humid climate. Even Saigon’s “reefer” (refrigerator) capacity is grossly short: a single cargo ship can carry far more than that.

Slowing the Buildup. All told, some 80,000 tons of supplies are backed up in Saigon’s warehouses and docks awaiting transshipment to other bases and field units. For the problem is not only unloading ocean vessels, but getting supplies out where they are needed. With a large part of South Viet Nam’s road and rail transportation out of commission, most goods must be moved up the coast in World War II LSTs, which are able to disgorge their cargo in shallow water right on the beach. Currently only 14 LSTs, manned largely by Japanese, are available to do the job. But last week the Pentagon was weighing a contract with Vancouver’s Alaska Barge & Transport Co. to put its oceangoing tugs and barges to work in Viet Nam waters. And the installation last week of a 300-ft. De Tong pier at Cam Ranh Bay upped South Viet Nam’s port capacity 15% at one stroke.

Until things dramatically improve, the U.S. capacity to carry the war to the enemy—and increase the size of U.S. manpower in Viet Nam—will be hobbled. Current target for blasting the pipeline clear: March 1966.