COLD WAR: The Upheld Conference

President Eisenhower’s mild tone and Russia’s conciliatory attitude in the case of the shot-down B-29 (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS) were symptoms of a new and cooler temper in the cold war. There were other readings. Sir Winston Churchill’s peroration at the Lord Mayor’s banquet in London expressed hope that “we might even find ourselves in a few years moving along a broad, smooth causeway of peace and plenty instead of roaming and peering around on the rim of hell.” And the Soviet radio celebrated the 21st anniversary of U.S. diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia by quoting George Washington: “Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations . . . should be excluded.”

Those who found a cooler temperature in Russia might merely be misreading the thermometer. But there was an easily chartable reason why the West felt better. At Paris the West had learned that paralysis in fear of Soviet displeasure was not a policy. At Paris the West’s statesmen had moved boldly for their own united defense, and then looked up to await Russia’s reaction with the calm of men who had done what they had to do.

Two Weeks’ Notice. Last week the reaction came. Calling a press conference to insure maximum publicity, the Russians invited 23 nations to a conference on European collective security. They included the U.S., and suggested that Red China come as an observer. They also included East, but not West Germany. They named a date—Nov. 29—candidly admitting that it was picked to forestall ratification of the Paris pact, scheduled for debate by the French Assembly Dec. 13. “Such ratification would complicate to a great degree the entire situation in Europe,” warned the Russian note, and “would mean that the unification of Germany . . . would be sacrificed to the present plan of restoring German militarism.”

It was a measure of the West’s growing self-confidence that the note scarcely furrowed a diplomatic brow. The man most vulnerable fielded it deftly. Said West Germany’s Chancellor Adenauer: “This conference would not have been proposed if the Paris agreements had not been signed last month. I would welcome such a conference in due time, especially if it would really lead to a collective security system for Europe, because this would mean the reunification of Germany. But such a conference would have to be well prepared. It dare not fail. I therefore do not believe it can be held two weeks from now.”

Time to Talk. In other words, Russia could not be allowed to frustrate or delay the West’s building strength. Once the Paris pact is safely ratified, the West’s Big Four would be ready to listen and to talk. The parley at the summit, so long urged by Churchill, may yet come off. On his recent visit to Washington, Adenauer told Dulles and Eisenhower frankly that since Germany can be unified only by agreement with Russia, as a political necessity he must seek talks once West Germany has received its sovereignty. Somewhat reluctantly, Dulles and Eisenhower pledged support. Eisenhower suggested that such talks should not follow too closely on ratification of the Paris pact, which should be completed by February. Probable date for a conference if there is one: late spring or early summer, 1955.