--- title: After Khamenei: What Iran, and the World, Face Next description: Long ago, the Islamic Republic learned to distribute coercive power across institutions to enable the state to survive crises. canonical: https://time.com/7381954/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-trump-israel/ author: Hamidreza Azizi article:opinion: true article:content_tier: free article:published_time: 2026-03-02T13:15:00.000Z article:modified_time: 2026-10-19T08:14:40.293Z article:section: Ideas og:title: After Khamenei: What Iran, and the World, Face Next og:description: "Long ago, the Islamic Republic learned to distribute coercive power across institutions to enable the state to survive crises," writes Hamidreza Azizi og:url: https://time.com/7381954/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-trump-israel/ og:site_name: TIME og:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blte0f98380d3ca2ade/69b04893c082a57e5fdee507/AP26060546190618.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 og:image:width: 6000 og:image:height: 3375 og:image:alt: APTOPIX Iran US Israel og:type: article twitter:card: summary_large_image twitter:title: After Khamenei: What Iran, and the World, Face Next twitter:description: "Long ago, the Islamic Republic learned to distribute coercive power across institutions to enable the state to survive crises," writes Hamidreza Azizi twitter:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blte0f98380d3ca2ade/69b04893c082a57e5fdee507/AP26060546190618.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 video:duration: 01:54 video:published: 2026-03-02 section: politics topics: Iran conflict, U.S. military operations, Iran nuclear program, ballistic missiles, Iranian navy, Operation Midnight Hammer, campaign timeline, state sponsorship of terror, presidential statement, U.S. forces overseas genre: news, political statement tones: assertive, combative, confident, defiant emotions: resolve (high), anger (medium), pride (medium) sentiment: negative audience: news followers, politics readers, foreign policy observers, general public people: Donald Trump organizations: United States military content_suitability: war [00:00-01:54]; violence [01:06-01:13]; politics [00:00-01:54] transcript_source: publisher captions transcript_reviewed: not applicable ---  # After Khamenei: What Iran, and the World, Face Next > Sponsored content. 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Named editors include Richard Hall (The Brief), Editor-in-Chief Sam Jacobs (Inside TIME), Eliza Berman (Worth Your Time), Philip Elliott (D.C. Brief), Justin Worland (Future Proof) and Harry Booth (In the Loop). Health Matters is written by TIME's health desk. #### How do I sign up for a TIME newsletter? Go to time.com/newsletters, choose the newsletters you want and enter your email address. There is no cost and no subscription requirement. ### Sources * TIME Newsletters: [time.com/newsletters](/c/time-nl-network-2026q3/newsletters?i=d8ff4b02-8e07-4ef6-b605-36244160a600&cr=time-nl-network-2026q3-v1) ## Video: Trump Say Iran Conflict Could Last "4 to 5 Weeks" or "Whatever It Takes" VERTICAL [Watch (HLS stream): Trump Say Iran Conflict Could Last "4 to 5 Weeks" or "Whatever It Takes" VERTICAL](https://cdn.jwplayer.com/manifests/oY0mJk5m.m3u8) (1:54)  _Published 2026-03-02. The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during the military strikes by the United States and Israel on Feb. 28 has triggered the most consequential moment of transition for the Islamic Republic since he came to power in 1989. On Monday, Israel and the United States continued strikes on Iran in a campaign that U.S. President Donald Trump said would likely take several weeks._ Description, summary, key points, chapters, key quotes, questions and transcript, where present, were produced automatically from the video or its captions and were not reviewed. ## Summary U.S. President Donald Trump describes ongoing large-scale U.S. combat operations in Iran and lays out the stated objectives of the campaign. He cites earlier warnings to Iran about rebuilding its nuclear program and the growth of its ballistic missile program. He says operations are ahead of projections, that the original estimate was 4 to 5 weeks, and that the U.S. can continue far longer. The clip ends as he rejects a suggestion that he will lose interest in the campaign. ## Key points - Trump says the U.S. military is carrying out large-scale combat operations in Iran to eliminate what he calls grave threats posed to America by the regime. (00:00) - He says the U.S. earlier warned Iran not to rebuild its nuclear program at a different location after Operation Midnight Hammer, but Iran ignored the warnings. (00:13) - He claims Iran's conventional ballistic missile program was growing rapidly and posed a colossal threat to America and its forces stationed overseas. (00:38) - First stated objective: destroying Iran's missile capabilities and its capacity to produce new missiles, which he says is happening on an hourly basis. (00:51) - Second stated objective: annihilating Iran's navy; Trump says ten ships have already been knocked out and are at the bottom of the sea. (01:06) - Third stated objective: ensuring Iran, which he calls the world's number one sponsor of terror, can never obtain a nuclear weapon. (01:13) - Trump says the campaign is substantially ahead of time projections, and that the original projection was 4 to 5 weeks but the U.S. can go far longer. (01:22) - Trump rejects a claim that he wants a quick campaign and will get bored, saying there is nothing boring about this. (01:43) ## Chapters - [00:00 to 00:13] Combat operations in Iran announced. Trump states the U.S. military is conducting large-scale combat operations to eliminate threats from the Iranian regime. - [00:13 to 00:51] Rationale: nuclear and missile threats. Trump recounts Operation Midnight Hammer, ignored warnings about rebuilding, and the growth of Iran's ballistic missile program. - [00:51 to 01:22] Three stated campaign objectives. Trump lists destroying missile capabilities, annihilating the navy, and preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. - [01:22 to 01:54] Timeline: 4 to 5 weeks or longer. Trump says the campaign is ahead of projections, that it could last far longer than 4 to 5 weeks, and that he won't get bored. ## Key quotes - [01:06] Donald Trump: "We're annihilating their navy." - [01:28] Donald Trump: "But whatever the time is, it's okay." - [01:33] Donald Trump: "Right from the beginning, we projected 4 to 5 weeks, but we have capability to go far longer than that." - [01:50] Donald Trump: "I don't get bored. There's nothing boring about this." - [01:17] Donald Trump: "the world's number one sponsor of terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon" ## Questions this video answers - What does Trump say the objectives of the U.S. operation in Iran are? [00:51] - How long does Trump say the Iran campaign was projected to last? [01:33] - Why does Trump say the U.S. is conducting combat operations in Iran? [00:38] - What does Trump claim has happened to Iran's navy? [01:06] - How does Trump respond to the suggestion that he will get bored of the campaign? [01:43] - What does Trump say about the warnings given to Iran after Operation Midnight Hammer? [00:22] ## Content suitability - war [00:00-01:54]: Trump discusses ongoing large-scale U.S. combat operations against Iran, including strikes on missile capabilities and the navy. - violence [01:06-01:13]: Trump says the U.S. is annihilating Iran's navy and claims ten ships have been sunk. - politics [00:00-01:54]: Presidential statement on military policy toward Iran, including nuclear and missile objectives. by [Hamidreza Azizi](https://time.com/author/hamidreza-azizi/) ## Hamidreza Azizi Hamidreza Azizi is a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group and the author of "The Axis of Resistance: Iran, Israel, and the Struggle for the Middle East." Mar 2, 2026 1:15 PM UTC The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during the military strikes by the United States and Israel on Feb. 28 has triggered the most consequential moment of transition for the Islamic Republic since he came to power in 1989\. On Monday, Israel and the United States continued strikes on Iran in a campaign that U.S. President Donald Trump said would likely take several weeks. by [Hamidreza Azizi](https://time.com/author/hamidreza-azizi/) ## Hamidreza Azizi Hamidreza Azizi is a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group and the author of "The Axis of Resistance: Iran, Israel, and the Struggle for the Middle East." Mar 2, 2026 1:15 PM UTC The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/28/world/middleeast/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-dead.html), during the military strikes by the United States and Israel on Feb. 28 has triggered the most consequential moment of transition for the Islamic Republic since he [came to power ](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-the-leader-who-shaped-irans-defiance)in 1989\. In the decades since, he showed little tolerance for internal dissent, while [transforming Iran](https://time.com/7381859/ali-khamenei-obituary-supreme-leader-iran-dead-86/) into a regional power with an axis of armed, non-state allies and proxies spread across the Middle East. He also built an institutionalized political system. In fact, the most striking feature of the immediate aftermath of his death has been continuity: Iranian missiles have continued to fly, senior officials have struck defiant postures, and security forces have moved swiftly to shape the streets before the streets can shape them. That early continuity is not incidental: it reflects Khamenei’s handiwork, namely a political system engineered to absorb shock and continue functioning. The Islamic Republic was designed to concentrate ultimate authority in the office of the Supreme Leader but under Khamenei it learned long ago to distribute coercive power across overlapping institutions—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the internal security apparatus—to allow the state to not only repress dissent and project its power but also endure during moments of crises and uncertainty. Those architectural decisions have produced a system capable of continuing to fight even as it negotiates internally over who ultimately holds the right to command. Indeed, the constitution of the Islamic Republic anticipates exactly this moment: it provides for a temporary transfer of the Supreme Leader’s duties to a leadership collective—the president, the head of the judiciary, and a senior cleric from the Guardian Council—while the Assembly of Experts, a body of senior clerics constitutionally mandated to select the Supreme Leader, deliberates and makes its choice. On Sunday, the Islamic Republic[ ](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/who-are-the-council-members-temporarily-in-charge-of-iran)[invoked that pathway](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/who-are-the-council-members-temporarily-in-charge-of-iran) and appointed President Masoud Pezeshkian, a reform-leaning politician, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, a veteran judicial and intelligence official close to the security establishment, and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, a Guardian Council member and head of Iran’s seminaries in Qom, to the interim leadership council. Constitutional procedure and political reality are rarely the same thing. The decisive question is not which body holds formal authority but where power consolidates in practice: among clerical institutions that safeguard the system’s legitimacy, or among security actors that can enforce order while the conflict grinds on.  Iran's Supreme National Security Council chief Ali Larijani (C) speaks to reporters in Beirut on August 13, 2025. AFP via Getty Images—AFP or licensors ### The architecture of a regime As the political process unfolds, the persistence of Iranian military operations after the Ayatollah’s death reflects institutional planning shaped by years of anticipating this very scenario. While Iran moved briskly to follow the constitutional pathway for a temporary transfer of power to its leadership collective, procedure alone does not account for the speed with which the system rallied and stabilized its response. In practice, authority and power had already gradually gravitated toward the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the country’s highest national security body and the security establishment surrounding it. The body is run by figures positioned at the intersection of civilian governance and military power, and are best placed to manage wartime decision making, particularly as the killing of the Ayatollah has radically compressed the window for elite bargaining. Early public messaging has underlined this shift. The man who addressed Iran and the world on television after the death of the Ayatollah was[ ](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/22/world/middleeast/iran-larijani-khamenei-pezeshkian.html)[Ali Larijani](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/22/world/middleeast/iran-larijani-khamenei-pezeshkian.html), the head of the national security council. A former IRGC commander and an experienced politician with a reputation for pragmatism, Larijani has been[ ](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/khameneis-absence-pragmatist-larijani-emerges-power-broker-iran-2026-03-01/)[overseeing](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/khameneis-absence-pragmatist-larijani-emerges-power-broker-iran-2026-03-01/) nuclear negotiations, regional relations, and suppression of recent protests. In his televised address, Larijani[ ](https://nournews.ir/fa/news/278617/%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8--%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%8C-%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85)[struck a tone](https://nournews.ir/fa/news/278617/%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8--%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%8C-%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85) that was at once defiant and carefully calibrated. He spoke of national unity, warned against those who would seek to “fragment the country,” and framed the confrontation not as a crisis of leadership but as an existential struggle for Iran itself. The message projected resolve and defiance toward the U.S. and Israel, while directing an unmistakable warning inward, toward any faction tempted to exploit the moment. The distribution of operational authority across institutions capable of acting under degraded or uncertain command conditions is defining the opening chapter of the post-Khamenei moment. Consider the missile operations. Their sustained tempo is not incidental; it illustrates how the system functions militarily under stress. Over the past two decades, Iran has invested heavily in creating a decentralized command structure in the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Tehran has embraced a[ ](https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-military-doctrine)[mosaic approach](https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-military-doctrine) in which regional and provincial commanders are empowered to act with significant autonomy should central communications be disrupted or central authority become ambiguous. Retaliation can proceed. Strategic continuity does not require immediate consensus on succession. Personnel moves have reinforced the strategic direction. Tehran has elevated Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, a hardliner who has served as deputy chief of the Revolutionary Guards and as defense and interior minister, to chief commander of the IRGC following the death of his predecessor. His appointment signals consolidation around actors whose career and authority are defined by military and operational credibility. It shows how authoritarian systems behave during periods of acute pressure and uncertainty. They tend to privilege those who can guarantee control over those who embody legitimacy. These dynamics explain why the Islamic Republic has not appeared leaderless, despite losing the man who was, for decades, its most powerful figure. The system’s immediate objective is to preserve coherence—buying enough time for elites to negotiate the political future from a position of institutional strength rather than exposed vulnerability. In Tehran, continuity is the strategy. ### How to run Iran after the Ayatollah Despite the co-ordination and planning for this moment, Khamenei’s removal does bring with it uncertainty and critical concerns about the longer term future of the regime, raising one key question in particular: Who inherits authority in a system built around a singular arbiter? Khamenei’s death removes the figure who balanced competing factions for more than three decades. And the question of who might ultimately succeed him is unfolding against the backdrop of a major conflict. That narrows the space for prolonged internal contestation. The succession process, in other words, will be shaped primarily by elite bargaining conducted under pressure. On paper, it seems straightforward. The Assembly of Experts has the mandate to select a new Supreme Leader, but the reality is that the outcome will depend on alignment among the various institutions capable of enforcing any decision. That is no easy task. Clerical legitimacy may remain necessary, but coercive capacity has become indispensable. Political and security figures with institutional reach—Larijani or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Parliament—are positioned to influence the transition because they can translate authority into immediate control. Wartime conditions favor consensus candidates or collective arrangements that minimize uncertainty over the regime’s immediate trajectory. In the short term, elite cohesion is likely to hold. External confrontation encourages restraint among rival factions, each aware that visible fragmentation could invite escalation from abroad or unrest at home. Larijani underscored it in his speech when he warned competing elites that “today is not the day to settle accounts.” Any such unity is conditional. Once the immediate crisis stabilizes, suppressed rivalries will reemerge around competing visions of governance, economic management, and Iran’s external posture.  In Karachi, mourners gather on March 1, 2026, to offer funeral prayers for protesters killed during clashes outside the U.S. Consulate. The demonstrations erupted following the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in military strikes by the United States and Israel strikes. Asif Hassan—AFP via Getty Images Khamenei’s death also reshapes the regime’s political narrative. The leadership can elevate his killing into a unifying symbol for its ideologically committed base, framing retaliation and internal discipline as acts of collective defense. “[Martyrdom](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/24/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-martyrdom-surrender-war-united-states-trump/)” has long served as a mobilizing language in the Islamic Republic, capable of reinforcing loyalty among core supporters while justifying tighter social and political control. That dynamic may strengthen hardline actors[ ](https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/316388/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D9%81%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B3%D8%A4%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%86%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%DA%86%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85)[who argue](https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/316388/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D9%81%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B3%D8%A4%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%86%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%DA%86%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85) that compromise invited vulnerability and that deterrence now requires a more assertive posture both domestically and regionally. Iran faces further uncertainty from regional dynamics on two fronts: the reactions of its axis of resistance across the region and the reactions of the Gulf countries. Khamenei’s religious authority—even if it was less potent than his predecessor—extended beyond Iran’s borders, and his death risks transforming an interstate confrontation into a broader ideological mobilization among allied non-state actors. Shia groups in Iraq and Lebanon that previously calibrated their involvement may now interpret escalation as an obligation tied to the loss of a religious leader.The danger for Tehran lies in managing this momentum: its axis of resistance can open new fronts quickly but their operational autonomy makes escalation harder to contain once it begins. Moreover, the conflict has significantly hurt Iran’s relations with neighboring Gulf countries that had been pursuing cautious rapprochement with Tehran. Iran’s missile strikes on cities and infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain have [rattled](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/02/arab-states-are-choosing-sides/686195/) the Gulf Arab states. They have coordinated their condemnation of the Iranian attacks and could consolidate a regional coalition against Iran. President Donald Trump has called upon the Iranian people to take over their government but that remains a highly unlikely scenario. Iran could possibly face gradual regime erosion driven by continued economic strain, sustained military pressure, and public discontent. Khamenei’s death removes a powerful symbol of continuity, but mass mobilization by opposition forces and political transformation would require organizational coherence and confidence that the state’s coercive apparatus can no longer enforce order. Iran’s decentralized security networks complicate that calculation. Iran, therefore, has entered a period of overlapping negotiations: among elites maneuvering over succession, among security actors managing the risks of escalation, and between the state and a restive society contesting the regime’s legitimacy. The final outcome will hinge on whether the coalition that sustains the Islamic Republic can remain cohesive long enough to redefine leadership without unraveling the system it is trying to preserve. Should Iranian elites manage to convert wartime cohesion into a stable succession, the Islamic Republic may emerge more centralized around its security establishment and more ruthless in suppressing internal dissent. Failure could introduce prolonged uncertainty in which rival factions could compete for leverage, external pressure could mount and domestic tensions could deepen. ## Transcript [00:00] Today, the United States military continues [00:02] to carry out large scale combat operations in [00:05] Iran to eliminate the grave threats posed to [00:08] America by this terrible terrorist regime. [00:13] Following our obliteration of [00:16] Iran's nuclear program in [00:18] Operation Midnight Hammer a short while ago, [00:22] we warned Iran not to make [00:25] any attempt to rebuild at a different location [00:27] because they were unable to use the ones [00:30] we so powerfully blew up. [00:33] But they ignored those warnings and refused [00:36] to cease their pursuit of nuclear weapons. [00:38] In addition, the regime's [00:40] conventional ballistic missile program [00:42] was growing rapidly and dramatically, [00:45] and this posed a very clear, [00:47] colossal threat to America and [00:49] our forces stationed overseas. [00:51] Our objectives are clear. [00:53] First, we're destroying Iran's missile capabilities, [00:58] and you see that happening on [00:59] an hourly basis and their capacity to [01:01] produce brand new ones and [01:03] pretty good ones they make second. [01:06] We're annihilating their navy. [01:08] We've knocked out already [01:10] ten ships there at the bottom of the sea. [01:13] Third, we're ensuring that [01:15] the world's number one sponsor of [01:17] terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon, [01:21] never going to have a nuclear weapon. [01:22] We're already substantially ahead [01:26] of our time projections. [01:28] But whatever the time is, it's okay. [01:30] Whatever it takes, we will always. [01:33] And we have. Right from the beginning, [01:36] we projected 4 to 5 weeks, [01:38] but we have capability [01:41] to go far longer than that. We'll do it. [01:43] Whatever. Somebody said today, [01:46] they said, oh, well, [01:47] the president wants to do it really quickly. [01:49] After that, he'll get bored. [01:50] I don't get bored. There's nothing [01:52] boring about this. Do you agree with. ```json [{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"OpinionNewsArticle","@id":"https://time.com/7381954/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-trump-israel/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://time.com/7381954/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-trump-israel/"},"headline":"After Khamenei: What Iran, and the World, Face Next","datePublished":"2026-03-02T13:15:00.000Z","dateModified":"2026-10-19T08:14:40.293Z","description":"Long ago, the Islamic Republic learned to distribute coercive power across institutions to enable the state to survive crises.","url":"https://time.com/7381954/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-trump-israel/","keywords":["world affairs"],"thumbnailUrl":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blte0f98380d3ca2ade/69b04893c082a57e5fdee507/AP26060546190618.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","author":[{"@type":"Person","name":"Hamidreza Azizi","jobTitle":"","url":"https://time.com/author/hamidreza-azizi/"}],"articleSection":"Ideas","image":[{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/blte0f98380d3ca2ade/69b04893c082a57e5fdee507/AP26060546190618.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","width":1200,"height":675,"headline":"APTOPIX Iran US Israel","caption":"APTOPIX Iran US Israel","creditText":"Vahid Salemi—Associated Press","representativeOfPage":true}],"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"Time","url":"https://time.com/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://time.com/images/logo.png","width":528,"height":156},"foundingDate":"March 3, 1923","sameAs":["https://www.facebook.com/time","https://www.instagram.com/time/?hl=en","https://twitter.com/time","https://www.pinterest.com/timemagazine"]}},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/section/ideas/","name":"Ideas"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/tag/world-affairs/","name":"world affairs"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/7381954/iran-ayatollah-khamenei-trump-israel/","name":"After Khamenei: What Iran, and the World, Face Next"}}]},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"VideoObject","name":"Trump Say Iran Conflict Could Last \"4 to 5 Weeks\" or \"Whatever It Takes\" [VERTICAL]","description":"The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during the military strikes by the United States and Israel on Feb. 28 has triggered the most consequential moment of transition for the Islamic Republic since he came to power in 1989. 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