Titan: The OceanGate Disaster Explores the Biggest Warning Signs of the Submersible Implosion

On June 18, 2023, a submersible imploded while trying to visit the remains of the R.M.S. Titanic, killing the five passengers onboard. The victims included Stockton Rush, the CEO of OceanGate, which designed the submersible, British-Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son Suleman, explorer Hamish Harding, and Paul-Henri Nargeolet, who had completed three dozen dives to the Titanic.

Two years since the implosion of the submersible, which was named Titan, OceanGate has suspended all commercial and exploration operations, and the U.S. Coast Guard has yet to publish the findings of its investigation into the disaster. In the meantime, a Netflix documentary out June 11 offers its own take on why the submersible imploded, featuring interviews with former OceanGate employees who said the disaster came as no surprise and that the submersible’s design was flawed from the beginning.

TIME talked to director Mark Monroe about uncovering red flags in the walk-up to the OceanGate submersible disaster. 

Flawed materials

The documentary shows that the materials used to build the submersible were flawed from the get-go. Tests had shown that the carbon fiber used in the submersible could not hold up on a dive as deep as the one to reach the Titanic. In tests, the fiber repeatedly came apart under pressure, making a loud pop and snapping sound as the threads broke.

“Everyone says the sound happened when the submersible was actually very close to the surface,” Monroe says. “You would think that would have been a clear warning that something was wrong.”

Given the submersible was still facing issues on its 80th test dive, a successful dive was likely never possible, former employees tell the filmmakers. “Maybe no test would have ever shown that it was safe to do it,” Monroe says. “There's not enough positive testing that shows that it's something that you should be doing with paying customers.”

It would have taken millions of dollars and years of more testing in order to prove that carbon fiber was safe to use in the hull, Monroe says. And it’s not clear where OceanGate was getting its money. “What is clear from my research and from talking to people is that they were not making money,” says Monroe. “There's zero chance that OceanGate was actually turning a profit.”

Rush had a fixation on making the carbon fiber work, which had deadly consequences. As Monroe says, “Had he followed the industry standard, sure, he might not have been able to make a carbon fiber submersible and take it to the Titanic, but maybe those people would still be alive.”

Cutting corners

Engineers interviewed in the documentary describe Rush as reckless, often rushing through tests and not concerned enough about the safety of the passengers. The key red flag is Rush’s decision not have a third-party inspection to examine the submersible, going against industry standards. Monroe says that Rush also skirted around regulations requiring the submersible be registered as a vehicle, and never registered it.

At one point during the project, the hull cracked and a new one had to be built. A miniature version of it was put through the same kinds of pressure tests that the first one had to go through.

Despite not having a single successful test, OceanGate decided to go ahead with manufacturing the submersible. At that point, Emily Hammermeister, assistant to the lead engineer at OceanGate, quit. At one point in the documentary, she says she felt “uncomfortable bolting people into the sub.”

She wasn’t the only employee who was unsatisfied. Monroe describes their viewpoint: “I think a lot of people didn't understand, why are we going forward if we can't get the model to not implode?” 

Viewers will hear surprising audio of David Lochridge, a submersible and former operations director, being verbally attacked by Rush after Lochridge wrote up a memo about all the safety issues that concerned him. The recording became available when the U.S. Coast Guard pursued its investigation. 

“Every expedition we’ve had, we’ve had issues,” as Lochridge can be heard saying in the audio. Rush accused Lochridge of not understanding his vision, which he described as “doing weird sh-t” that’s “definitely out of the mold.” Rush, the documentary shows, took any criticism of his project as a personal attack. 

Lessons from the disaster

Monroe hopes that the Titan tragedy will make viewers skeptical about whether such expeditions are necessary in the future, arguing, “We’ve seen a billionaire travel craze, and the desire for those with means to do something in this world that others can't do. This experience feeds into that desire.”