--- title: The Coming Battle Over the Arctic description: The era of "Arctic exceptionalism" is over. The High North is no longer insulated from geopolitics everywhere else. canonical: https://time.com/7004330/arctic-us-russia-china/ author: Max Bergmann article:opinion: true article:content_tier: free article:published_time: 2024-07-29T11:00:00.000Z article:modified_time: 2026-03-30T13:25:30.214Z article:section: Ideas og:title: The Coming Battle Over the Arctic og:description: The era of "Arctic exceptionalism" is over. The High North is no longer insulated from geopolitics everywhere else. og:url: https://time.com/7004330/arctic-us-russia-china/ og:site_name: TIME og:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/bltd3e29c7fdb5d002f/698a594fd07533fd61e710a8/GettyImages-1239418302.jpg?branch=production&width=1024&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 og:image:width: 1024 og:image:height: 576 og:image:alt: TOPSHOT-defence-NORWAY-NATO-POLITICS-DEFENCE og:type: article twitter:card: summary_large_image twitter:title: The Coming Battle Over the Arctic twitter:description: The era of "Arctic exceptionalism" is over. The High North is no longer insulated from geopolitics everywhere else. twitter:image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/bltd3e29c7fdb5d002f/698a594fd07533fd61e710a8/GettyImages-1239418302.jpg?branch=production&width=1024&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 ---  # The Coming Battle Over the Arctic > Sponsored content. Supplied in partnership with TIME. 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Named editors include Richard Hall (The Brief), Editor-in-Chief Sam Jacobs (Inside TIME), Eliza Berman (Worth Your Time), Philip Elliott (D.C. Brief), Justin Worland (Future Proof) and Harry Booth (In the Loop). Health Matters is written by TIME's health desk. #### How do I sign up for a TIME newsletter? Go to time.com/newsletters, choose the newsletters you want and enter your email address. There is no cost and no subscription requirement. ### Sources * TIME Newsletters: [time.com/newsletters](/c/time-nl-network-2026q3/newsletters?i=c772d33e-335d-4a18-a265-a981314c8f32&cr=time-nl-network-2026q3-v1) by [Max Bergmann](https://time.com/author/max-bergmann/) and [Otto Svendsen](https://time.com/author/otto-svendsen/) Jul 29, 2024 11:00 AM UTC  U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, part of the 6th Marine Regiment participate in the international military exercise Cold Response 22, at Sandstrand, North of in Norway, on March 21, 2022. U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, part of the 6th Marine Regiment participate in the international military exercise Cold Response 22, at Sandstrand, North of in Norway, on March 21, 2022. Jonathan Nackstrand—AFP/Getty Images by [Max Bergmann](https://time.com/author/max-bergmann/) and [Otto Svendsen](https://time.com/author/otto-svendsen/) Jul 29, 2024 11:00 AM UTC Since the end of the Cold War, the High North has been defined by the idea of “[Arctic exceptionalism](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/01/arctic-exceptionalism-melting-away-us-isnt-sure-what-it-wants-next/162557/),” the common understanding that the region had unwritten rules, beliefs, and history that protected it from great-power rivalry. Under this shield, China emerged in recent years as a new power in the European Arctic through increased trade, investments, and scientific cooperation. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has [disrupted this delicate status quo](https://www.economist.com/china/2024/06/19/china-and-russia-have-chilling-plans-for-the-arctic) in [profound ways](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/31/arctic-council-russia-norway/). The European Arctic is fast becoming an arena in which the U.S. and its allies must compete directly with its geopolitical foes. To be sure, the war in Ukraine is not the only driver of increasing tensions. Retreating sea ice has led to greater interest in the region’s economic value and geopolitical importance, [fueling militarization](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/disruption-arctic-exceptionalism-managing-environmental-change-light-russian-aggression) among Arctic states and engagement from traditionally non-Arctic players such as China. These economic pressures have typically centered on three areas. **Read More:** [_An Arctic Border Town Feels a New Chill From Russia_](https://time.com/6301782/tk-russia-norway/) First, the Arctic contains vast fossil fuel reserves, the development of which is a key priority in Russia’s Arctic [strategic vision for 2035](https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C57/). The Russian Arctic alone is [estimated](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/mapping-russia-arctic-hydrocarbon-development-scheme/) to contain more than 35,700 billion cubic meters of natural gas and more than 2,300 million metric tons of oil and condensate, mainly concentrated in the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas. Second, changing ice conditions caused by climate change is reshaping potential Arctic shipping routes. Russia’s development of the Northern Sea Route along its Arctic coasts, which intends to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Russian Arctic, is particularly noteworthy. The route is ice-free during the summer and [enables](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251629926%5FThe%5FNorthern%5FSea%5FRoute%5Fversus%5Fthe%5FSuez%5FCanal%5Fcases%5Ffrom%5Fbulk%5Fshipping) ships to reduce travel time by 40% with significant fuel savings compared to transit through the Suez Canal. Third, the successful co-management of fisheries in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea is at danger of collapsing under mounting climate pressures. As surface air temperatures continue to rise dramatically, warming waters are [causing](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/hot-water-arctic-fisheries-proxy-geopolitical-tensions) fish stocks with marine catch potential to extend further north. Some have speculated that Russia could use commercial activities in a broader challenge to NATO. Norwegian naval intelligence has already claimed that between 50 and 100 Russian fishing vessels operating in Norwegian waters may be [linked](https://www.nrk.no/nordland/xl/fiskebater-og-andre-fartoy-fra-russland-kan-drive-spionasje-og-etterretning-i-norge-1.16371100) to intelligence gathering activities. The blurring distinction between commercial and military activities in the region, coupled with more military exercises there, has resulted in a heightened danger of accidents involving fishers. Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago located midway between the North Pole and Norway’s northern coast, is a particular source of tension, since Russia [does not recognize](https://www.csis.org/analysis/arctic-geopolitics-svalbard-archipelago) Norway’s jurisdiction to inspect and arrest vessels in the island’s waters beyond 12 nautical miles. It’s in this context that growing Russia-China collaboration is a concern to the U.S. and its Arctic NATO allies. Even prior to the war in Ukraine, Moscow looked to its eastern neighbor to develop the Northern Sea Route, invest in Arctic energy projects and infrastructure, and enhance military cooperation. But Russia’s international isolation since Ukraine has made the Kremlin reliant on Beijing to finance its energy export infrastructure in the Arctic, where over 80% of Russia’s natural gas production and almost 20% percent of its oil production [comes](https://t.co/yOc38QglBC) from. The West’s longstanding focus on engagement and cooperation in the European Arctic has also been instrumentalized by China to make inroads. China has pursued investments in Arctic energy and logistics infrastructure (in [Greenland](https://www.politico.eu/article/china-arctic-greenland-united-states/), [Svalbard](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/01/norway-blocks-sale-last-private-land-svalbard-china-interest), [Northern Sweden](https://www.politico.eu/article/chinese-wind-farm-investments-stoke-concerns-in-sweden/), and [Northern Norway](https://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/06/china-eyes-stake-kirkenes-infrastructure-10-06)) in a [long-term effort](https://www.cna.org/reports/2022/01/exploring-the-relationship-between-chinas-investment-in-the-arctic-and-its-national-strategy) to consolidate Beijing’s energy security, sustain economic growth, and expand its global reach. But as the seven non-Russian Arctic states have grown wary of China’s strategic ambitions and coercive economic tactics, Beijing is increasingly relying on Moscow to act as a conduit to expand Chinese activities in the Arctic writ large. These factors could provide China with a pretense to consolidate a more substantive presence in the European Arctic, be it through joint military exercises, investments in Russian energy infrastructure, or a role in maritime law enforcement. A [recent cooperation agreement](https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-and-china-are-developing-maritime-law-enforcement-cooperation) between the Russian Federal Security Service and the Chinese Coast Guard may open the door for China in Arctic security affairs, since coast guard tasks entail protecting sovereign rights at sea, such as fishing resources and access to oil and gas infrastructure. That said, the short-term impact from increased geopolitical jostling over the Arctic should not be exaggerated. First, large-scale mineral resource extraction in the Arctic still [requires](https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/news/if-we-want-an-energy-transition-we-must-have-more-mining/) significant new investments in mining infrastructure while the region [remains](https://www.vox.com/climate/23863150/biden-arctic-drilling-big-oil) an extremely expensive place to drill for oil. Second, overt military aggression will likely remain limited since Russia can scarcely afford to shift its attention to the High North with its objectives in Ukraine far from achieved and its ground forces [depleting](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-army-lost-70k-soldiers-ukraine-war-uk-defense-ministry/) at an increasing rate. Likewise, a slumping domestic Chinese economy will likely keep Beijing focused on domestic policy issues and limit expansive engagement in the European Arctic in the coming years. Beijing has largely [engaged selectively](https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/a-china-russia-arctic-alliance-not-so-fast/) with Russia in the Arctic in areas that further China’s own interest, such as increased science diplomacy and purchasing heavily discounted Russian oil and gas, thus failing to meet Moscow’s lofty expectations for what its “limitless friendship” would entail. But that does not mean that Western governments can afford to be complacent on the Arctic. To its credit, Washington is increasingly recognizing the nuances of the Arctic’s growing geopolitical salience. The Department of Defense’s recently released [Arctic strategy](https://t.co/yOc38QglBC) reflects the need to rethink U.S. engagement by emphasizing enhanced domain awareness and Arctic capabilities, closer engagement with regional allies and partners, and exercising tailored presence. Increasing Russian military and grey zone activities has already illustrated the implications of a changing Arctic threat environment. Several incidents of interference with critical undersea infrastructure have [highlighted](https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-role-protecting-critical-undersea-infrastructure) the pressing threat that Russian hybrid tactics present to Northern Europe. Cooperation on undersea mapping and maritime domain awareness is thus a promising area to pursue in the short-term, and one NATO is [paying attention](https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-role-protecting-critical-undersea-infrastructure) to. Another area of emphasis should be to enhance coordination of investment screenings and the use of international scientific research and science diplomacy as a guise for China to establish a foothold in the European Arctic. The era of “Arctic exceptionalism” may be coming to a close. 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