--- description: The West needs to look to the Russia-dependent economies of Central Asia to mitigate collateral damage of sanctions, says Bradley Jardine. title: Column: War in Ukraine Spells Disaster for Central Asia image: https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/bltc2870559161ae8f4/698a2fd5d07533c545e6ca02/GettyImages-1228656965.jpg?branch=production&width=2400&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=16:9 ---  * [Ideas](/section/ideas/) ## Ideas Update your preferences in [Account Settings](/account/preferences/) Close * [russia](/tag/russia/) ## russia Update your preferences in [Account Settings](/account/preferences/) Close # Russia’s War in Ukraine Spells Disaster for Neighboring Central Asia by [Bradley Jardine](/author/bradley-jardine/) ## Bradley Jardine Update your preferences in [Account Settings](/account/preferences/) Close Mar 11, 2022 3:20 AM CUT  A migrant worker from Uzbekistan at a tent camp in the Kinel District of Samara, Russia, Sept. 22, 2020. A migrant worker from Uzbekistan at a tent camp in the Kinel District of Samara, Russia, Sept. 22, 2020.Albert Dzen—TASS/Getty Images by [Bradley Jardine](/author/bradley-jardine/) ## Bradley Jardine Update your preferences in [Account Settings](/account/preferences/) Close Mar 11, 2022 3:20 AM CUT In a world of economic interdependence, sanctioning Russia will likely prove more globally destabilizing than policymakers realize. To be effective, the West needs to look to vulnerable Russia-dependent economies, like those of Central Asia, in order to mitigate collateral damage. Landlocked Central Asia is flanked on all sides by countries sanctioned by the West—Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. Now the region is struggling to cope with the new economic onslaught on Moscow. Energy-rich Kazakhstan, which exports two-thirds of its oil supplies [through](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-kazakh-oil-flows-caught-russian-export-problems-traders-say-2022-03-01/ "undefined") Russian ports, is reeling from the international sanctions regime and burning through vital currency [reserves](https://eurasianet.org/central-asia-currencies-feeling-heavy-pressure-from-rubles-tumble "undefined") to prop up its faltering national currency, the tenge. These challenges come at a sensitive time for Kazakhstan, which has been working to re-establish investor confidence following violent [unrest](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/16/kazakhstan-authorities-raise-death-toll-from-unrest-to-225 "undefined") in January 2022 that left 225 people dead. Further south, in the republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, governments are bracing for high unemployment and budgetary shortfalls. Seasonal migration provides a vital [lifeline](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/07/13/economic-and-social-impacts-of-covid-19-update-from-listening-to-tajikistan "undefined") to these countries, which sent 7.8 million workers to Russia [last year](https://www.rferl.org/a/central-asia-migrants-ruble-impact/31730968.html "undefined"), reducing unemployment and easing strain on public services while allowing families to [purchase](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1683442 "undefined") basic necessities. **Read More:** [_Even If Russia Wins, It Won’t Do So Easily_](https://time.com/6151673/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin/ "undefined") But addiction to the short-term fix of migration has also left them [vulnerable](https://oxussociety.org/covid-19-and-central-asian-over-dependence-on-labor-migration-an-update-on-the-central-asia-migration-tracker/ "undefined") to external shocks. Remittances currently account for 30% of Tajikistan’s GDP, 28% of the Kyrgyz Republic’s, and some 12% of GDP for less exposed Uzbekistan, the most populous country in the region. As the ruble [falls](https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-07-22/h%5F072efe1fd9810d31355474beb612b853 "undefined") to just 155 against the dollar (a record low), these three states will face the dual pressures of collapsing state and household budgets, leaving millions suffering from food insecurity. Granted, this is not the region’s first rodeo. Remittances to the region plummeted by 40% in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the sanctions it triggered. COVID-19 was another lesson in the dangers of interdependence, with Russian border closures resulting in a 22% decline in overall remittances. Impoverished Tajikistan was hit particularly hard, with migrants sending just $1.7 billion back home—a $835 million [decrease](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/3/7/far-from-putins-russia-tajikistans-people-feel-sanctions-pain "undefined") on the year prior. But the current sanctions package is unlike anything we have ever seen before, and the long-term [consequences](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2022/03/vladimir-putin-economy-sanctions-swift-fallout/623330/&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1646850300521836&usg=AOvVaw2dobEOc6qIA038z9M-IV%5Fs "undefined") will be immense.  Trucks in Hai 'an City, Jiangsu Province, China, line up with building materials for export to Uzbekistan on May 29, 2020. Costfoto/Future Publishing via Getty Images ## Russia’s crisis is China’s opportunity Only last August, Central Asia was [struggling](https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/no-place-for-afghan-refugees-in-central-asia/#:~:text=While%20Uzbekistan%20claims%20to%20have,flights%20with%20Afghanistan%20in%20August. "undefined") to cope with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the return of the extremist Taliban movement to power, and an Afghan refugee crisis (which may yet grow as food insecurity there hits [95%](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/24/afghanistan-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/#:~:text=The%20organization%20also%20estimated%20that,has%20continued%20to%20get%20worse. "undefined") of households). Now, a Russian collapse will prove even more destabilizing, raising the specter of instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese province that borders the region. For China, Tajikistan’s vulnerable 1,357-kilometer border with Afghanistan has been a recurring source of concern. In 2019, the New York _Times_ [leaked](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html "undefined") the “Xinjiang Papers,” revealing secret speeches made by President Xi Jinping during a 2014 visit to Xinjiang in the wake of a series of violent attacks across China. “After the United States pulls out of Afghanistan,” he warned, “terrorist organizations positioned on the frontiers of Afghanistan and Pakistan may quickly infiltrate into Central Asia.” Tajikistan has become an unlikely buffer preventing instability from Afghanistan spilling over into Xinjiang, where China has detained an estimated 1.8 million Turkic minorities in campaign widely referred to as cultural genocide. The two countries conducted their first bilateral exercises in 2016, involving some 10,000 troops, and China has provided material support to the Central Asian country’s border defense. More noteworthy, Beijing has [built](https://www.rferl.org/a/china-eurasia-standish-tajik-base/31520628.html "undefined") and taken over the administration of a number of military bases along the volatile Tajik-Afghan border. Russian strategic capacity in the region should not be underestimated. In January this year, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev [called](https://abcnews.go.com/International/russian-troops-begin-leaving-kazakhstan-government-restores-control/story?id=82243668 "undefined") on Russian forces, not Chinese, to help reestablish control in the wake of violent protests wracking his country. Moscow also provided vital [support](https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-afghan-crisis-serves-as-opportunity-to-show-off-military-might "undefined") to Tajik and Afghan forces stationed on the Afghan border in August 2021, following the U.S. withdrawal. **Read More:** [_How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Could Change the Global Order Forever_](https://time.com/6150874/world-order-russia-ukraine/ "undefined") But the long-term arc points to Chinese hegemony. In the economic sphere, China has already displaced Russia. Russia–Central Asia trade currently stands at [around](https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD%5F248.pdf "undefined") $18.6 billion, two thirds of China’s, and a far cry from the 1990s when it accounted for 80% of the region’s trade ($110 billion). Meanwhile, China is rapidly emerging as a major [arms provider](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-52-russias-shadow-chinas-rising-security-presence-central-asia "undefined") and [strategic partner](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-68-central-asias-multi-vector-defense-diplomacy "undefined") in the region, albeit still far from eclipsing Moscow. Rapid economic decline will accelerate these trends. While Russia’s economy suffers under the weight of sanctions, China’s trade with Central Asia has already [bounced](https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-kazakhstan-trade-with-china-bounces-back-after-corona-slump "undefined") back to pre-pandemic levels, up nearly 18% in Kyrgyzstan from $6.37 billion in 2019 to $7.5 billion in 2021\. The outlook remains similar for the rest of the region. These gains will not compensate Central Asia for the sudden exit of Russia from the regional market, however. Indeed, the sudden shock to its fragile political and economic balance could result in a more assertive and domineering China, seizing advantage of the widening power asymmetry between itself and its neighbors. Beijing already holds over 40% of [Tajikistan](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3155133/why-china-funding-base-tajikistan&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1646851506613877&usg=AOvVaw1-qXp65cAZoUsavnnYbAXH "undefined") and [Kyrgyzstan](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-kyrgyzstan-china/kyrgyzstan-in-talks-to-restructure-1-8-billion-in-debt-to-china-idUSKCN22B0OG&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1646851597485749&usg=AOvVaw3JVmpxQOL0ykjsqVNSnEj0 "undefined")’s national debts. Economic decline may result in more security concessions to China in exchange for debt alleviation. The economic catastrophe of the Ukraine war will reverberate far beyond Russia’s borders for decades to come. While the sanctions may be a just response to Putin’s aggression in Europe, they are without precedent and could result in violent instability in neighboring countries. The international community needs to work to mitigate collateral damage before it is too late. ```json [{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"OpinionNewsArticle","@id":"https://time.com/6156524/russia-ukraine-central-asia-impact/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https://time.com/6156524/russia-ukraine-central-asia-impact/"},"headline":"Russia’s War in Ukraine Spells Disaster for Neighboring Central Asia","datePublished":"2022-03-11T03:20:21.000Z","dateModified":"2026-05-11T04:54:26.928Z","description":"The West needs to look to the Russia-dependent economies of Central Asia to mitigate collateral damage of sanctions","url":"https://time.com/6156524/russia-ukraine-central-asia-impact/","keywords":["russia","overnight"],"thumbnailUrl":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/bltc2870559161ae8f4/698a2fd5d07533c545e6ca02/GettyImages-1228656965.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","author":[{"@type":"Person","name":"Bradley Jardine","jobTitle":null,"url":"https://time.com/author/bradley-jardine/"}],"articleSection":"Ideas","image":[{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://static.time.com/v3/assets/bltea6093859af6183b/bltc2870559161ae8f4/698a2fd5d07533c545e6ca02/GettyImages-1228656965.jpg?branch=production&width=1200&quality=75&auto=webp&crop=1200:675&height=675","width":1200,"height":675,"headline":"Migrant workers set up tent camp in Russia's Samara Region","caption":"Migrant workers set up tent camp in Russia's Samara Region","creditText":"Albert Dzen—TASS/Getty Images","representativeOfPage":true}],"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"Time","url":"https://time.com/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https://time.com/images/logo.png","width":528,"height":156},"foundingDate":"March 3, 1923","sameAs":["https://www.facebook.com/time","https://www.instagram.com/time/?hl=en","https://twitter.com/time","https://www.pinterest.com/timemagazine"]}},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"item":{"@id":"/section/ideas/","name":"Ideas"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"item":{"@id":"/tag/russia/","name":"russia"}},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"item":{"@id":"https://time.com/6156524/russia-ukraine-central-asia-impact/","name":"Russia’s War in Ukraine Spells Disaster for Neighboring Central Asia"}}]},{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"VideoObject","name":"President Biden Announces a Ban on Russian Oil Imports","description":"On March 8, 2022, President Joe Biden announced a ban Russian oil imports, toughening the toll on Russia's economy in retaliation for its invasion of Ukraine.","thumbnailUrl":"https://cdn.jwplayer.com/v2/media/p6Zuwbsd/poster.jpg?width=720","uploadDate":"2022-03-08T18:00:00.000Z","contentUrl":"https://cdn.jwplayer.com/manifests/p6Zuwbsd.m3u8","embedUrl":"https://time.com/6156524/russia-ukraine-central-asia-impact/","duration":"PT3M50S","potentialAction":{"@type":"SeekToAction","target":"https://time.com/6156524/russia-ukraine-central-asia-impact/?jw_start={seek_to_second_number}","startOffset-input":"required name=seek_to_second_number"}}] ```