Here’s What Robert Mueller Has Uncovered So Far, in His Own Words

[The Internet Research Agency LLC] (Агентство Интернет Исследований) is a Russian organization engaged in political and electoral interference operations. In or around July 2013, the [the Internet Research Agency] registered with the Russian government as a Russian corporate entity. … The [Internet Research Agency] employed hundreds of individuals for its online operations, ranging from creators of fictitious personas to technical and administrative support. The [Internet Research Agency’s] annual budget totaled the equivalent of millions of U.S. dollars.

[Employees of the Internet Research Agency] posing as U.S. persons and creating false U.S. personas, operated social media pages and groups designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and pages, which addressed divisive U.S. political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists when, in fact, they were controlled by [the Internet Research Agency]. [Employees] also used the stolen identities of real U.S. persons to post on [Internet Research Agency]-controlled social media accounts. … The [Internet Research Agency] sought, in part, to conduct what it called “information warfare against the United States of America” through fictitious U.S. personas on social media platforms and other Internet-based media.

[The Internet Research Agency] had a strategic goal to sow discord in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election. [Employees] posted derogatory information about a number of candidates, and by early to mid-2016, [employees’] operations included supporting the presidential campaign of then-candidate Donald J. Trump (“Trump Campaign”) and disparaging Hillary Clinton. [Employees] made various expenditures to carry out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities. [Employees] also staged political rallies inside the United States, and while posing as U.S. grassroots entities and U.S. persons, and without revealing their Russian identities and [Internet Research Agency] affiliation, solicited and compensated real U.S. persons to promote or disparage candidates.

By 2016, [employees of the Internet Research Agency] and their co-conspirators used their fictitious online personas to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. They engaged in operations primarily intended to communicate derogatory information about Hillary Clinton, to denigrate other candidates such as Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, and to support Bernie Sanders and then-candidate Donald Trump.

On or about August 18, 2016, the real “Florida for Trump” Facebook account responded to the false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” account with instructions to contact a member of the Trump Campaign (“Campaign Official 1”) involved in the campaign’s Florida operations and provided Campaign Official 1’s email address at the campaign domain donaldtrump.com. On approximately the same day, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the email address of a false U.S. persona, joshmilton024@gmail.com, to send an email to Campaign Official 1 at that donaldtrump.com email account. …

On or about August 19, 2016, a supporter of the Trump Campaign sent a message to the [Internet Research Agency]-controlled “March for Trump” Twitter account about a member of the Trump Campaign (“Campaign Official 2”) who was involved in the campaign’s Florida operations and provided Campaign Official 2’s email address at the domain donaldtrump.com. On or about the same day, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the false U.S. persona joshmilton024@gmail.com account to send an email to Campaign Official 2 at that donaldtrump.com email account. …

On or about August 19, 2016, the real “Florida for Trump” Facebook account sent another message to the false U.S. persona “Matt Skiber” account to contact a member of the Trump Campaign (“Campaign Official 3”) involved in the campaign’s Florida operations. On or about August 20, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the “Matt Skiber” Facebook account to contact Campaign Official 3.

In early March 2016, [George Papadopoulos] learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the Campaign. [Papadopoulos] was living in London, England, at the time. Based on a conversation that took place on or about March 6, 2016, with a supervisory campaign official (the “Campaign Supervisor”), [Papadopoulos] understood that a principal foreign policy focus of the Campaign was an improved U.S. relationship with Russia.

On or about March 14, 2016, while traveling in Italy, [Papadopoulos] met an individual who was a professor based in London (the “Professor”). Initially, the Professor seemed uninterested in [Papadopoulos]. However, after [Papadopoulos] informed the Professor about his joining the Campaign, the Professor appeared to take great interest in [Papadopoulos]. [Papadopoulos] was interested in the Professor because, among other reasons, the Professor claimed to have substantial connections with Russian government officials, which [Papadopoulos] thought could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Campaign.

On or about March 24, 2016, [Papadopoulos] met with the Professor in London. The Professor brought with him a female Russian national (the “Female Russian National”), introduced to [Papadopoulos] as a relative of Russian President Vladimir Putin with connections to senior Russian government officials. … Following his March 24, 2016 meeting with the Professor and the Female Russian National, [Papadopoulos] emailed the Campaign Supervisor and several members of the Campaign’s foreign policy team and stated that he had just met with his “good friend” the Professor, who had introduced him to the Female Russian National (described by [Papadopoulos] in the email as “Putin’s niece”) and the Russian Ambassador in London. [Papadopoulos] stated that the topic of their discussion was “to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump.” The Campaign Supervisor responded that he would “work it through the campaign,” but that no commitments should be made at that point. The Campaign Supervisor added: “Great work.” … [Papadopoulos] later learned that the Female Russian National was not in fact a relative of President Putin.

On or about March 31, 2016, [Papadopoulos] attended a “national security meeting” in Washington, D.C., with then-candidate Trump and other foreign policy advisors for the Campaign. When [Papadopoulos] introduced himself to the group, he stated, in sum and substance, that he had connections that could help arrange a meeting between then-candidate Trump and President Putin. After his trip to Washington, D.C., [Papadopoulos] worked with the Professor and the Female Russian National to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government, and took steps to advise the Campaign of his progress. In early April 2016, [Papadopoulos] sent multiple emails to other members of the Campaign’s foreign policy team regarding his contacts with “the Russians” and his “outreach to Russia.”

On or about April 26, 2016, [Papadopoulos] met the Professor for breakfast at a London hotel. During this meeting, the Professor told [Papadopoulos] that he had just returned from a trip to Moscow where he had met with high­ level Russian government officials. The Professor told [Papadopoulos] that on that trip he (the Professor) learned that the Russians had obtained “dirt” on then-candidate Clinton. The Professor told [Papadopoulos],as [Papadopoulos] later described to the FBI, that “They [the Russians] have dirt on her”; “the Russians had emails ofClinton”; “they have thousands of emails.”

Cohen is a licensed attorney and has been since 1992. Until 2007, Cohen practiced as an attorney for multiple law firms, working on, among other things, negligence and malpractice cases. For that work, Cohen earned approximately $75,000 per year. In 2007, Cohen seized on an opportunity. The board of directors of a condominium building in which Cohen lived was attempting to remove from the building the name of the owner [Trump] of a Manhattan-based real estate company [the Trump Organization]. Cohen intervened, secured the backing of the residents of the building, and was able to remove the entire board of directors, thereby fixing the problem for [Trump]. Not long after, Cohen was hired by the Company to the position of “Executive Vice President” and “Special Counsel” to [Trump]. He earned approximately $500,000 per year in that position.

The Moscow Project was a lucrative business opportunity that sought, and likely required, the assistance of the Russian government. If the project was completed, the [Trump Organization] could have received hundreds of millions of dollars from Russian sources in licensing fees and other revenues.

In or around November 2015, Cohen received the contact information for, and spoke with, a Russian national who claimed to be a “trusted person” in the Russian Federation who could offer the campaign “policy synergy” and “synergy on a government level.” The defendant recalled that this person repeatedly proposed a meeting between [Trump] and the President of Russia. The person told Cohen that such a meeting could have a “phenomenal” impact “not only in political but in a business dimension as well,” referring to the Moscow Project, because there is “no bigger warranty in any project than consent of [the President of Russia].” …

[Cohen] explained that he did not pursue the proposed meeting, which did not take place, in part because he was working on the Moscow Project with a different individual who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government.

Cohen did recall that in or around January 2016, Cohen received a response from the office of Russian Official 1, the Press Secretary for the President of Russia, and spoke to a member of that office about the Moscow Project. … Cohen called Assistant 1 and spoke to her for approximately 20 minutes. On that call, Cohen described his position at the [Trump Organization] and outlined the proposed Moscow Project, including the Russian development company with which the Company had partnered. Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in security land to build the proposed tower and financing the construction. Assistant 1 asked detailed questions and took notes, stating that she would follow up with others in Russia.

As late as approximately June 2016, Cohen and Individual 2 discussed efforts to obtain Russian governmental approval for the Moscow Project. Cohen discussed the status and progress of the Moscow Project with [Trump] on more than … three occasions … and he briefed family members of [Trump] within the [Trump Organization] about the project.

Cohen agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the Moscow Project and took steps in contemplation of [Trump’s] possible travel to Russia. … Cohen asked [Trump] about the possibility of [Trump] traveling to Russia in connection with the Moscow Project, and asked a senior campaign official about potential business travel to Russia.

On approximately June 16, 2015, [Trump], for whom Cohen worked at the time, began an ultimately successful campaign for President of the United States. Cohen had no formal title with the campaign, but had a campaign email address, and, at various times advised the campaign, including on matters of interest to the press. Cohen also made media appearances as a surrogate and supporter of [Trump].

American Media, Inc. (“AMI”) is a corporation based in New York. AMI owns and publishes magazines, supermarket tabloids, and books, including the National Enquirer, OK! Magazine, Star Magazine, Radar Online, Men’s Journal, and Muscle & Fitness Her’s. … In or about August 2015, David Pecker, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of AMI, met with Michael Cohen, an attorney for a presidential candidate, and at least one other member of the campaign. At the meeting, Pecker offered to help deal with negative stories about that presidential candidate’s relationships with women by, among other things, assisting the campaign in identifying such stories so they could be purchased and their publication avoided. Pecker agreed to keep Cohen apprised of any such negative stories.

During the campaign, Cohen played a central role in two similar schemes to purchase the rights of stories — each from women who claimed to have had an affair with [Trump] — so as to suppress the stories and thereby prevent them from influencing the election. With respect to both payments, Cohen acted with the intent to influence the 2016 presidential election. Cohen coordinated his actions with one or more members of the campaign, including through meetings and phone calls, about the fact, nature, and timing of the payments. In particular, and as Cohen himself has now admitted, with respect to both payments, he acted in coordination with and at the direction of [Trump].

In or about June 2016, an attorney representing a model and actress attempting to sell her story of her alleged extramarital affair with the aforementioned presidential candidate contacted an editor at the National Enquirer. Pecker and the editor called Cohen and informed him of the story. At Cohen’s urging and subject to Cohen’s promise that AMI would be reimbursed, the editor began negotiating for the purchase of the story.

On or about December 28, 2016, then-President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which was to take effect the following day. The executive order announced sanctions against Russia in response to that government’s actions intended to interfere with the 2016 presidential election (“U.S. Sanctions”).

On or about December 28, 2016, the Russian Ambassador contacted [Flynn]. … On or about December 29, 2016, FLYNN called a senior official ofthe Presidential Transition Team … who was with other senior ·members of the Presidential Transition Team at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida, to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to the Russian Ambassador about the U.S. Sanctions. On that call, [Flynn] and the [transition team] official discussed the U.S. Sanctions, including the potential impact ofthose sanctions on the incoming administration’s foreign policy goals. The [transition team] official and [Flynn] also discussed that the members of the Presidential Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation. … Shortly after his phone call with the Russian Ambassador, [Flynn] spoke with the [transition team] official to report on the substance of his call with the Russian Ambassador, including their discussion of the U.S. Sanctions. On or about December 30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin released a statement indicating that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the U.S. Sanctions at that time.

After signing the plea agreement, Manafort stated that he had no direct or indirect communications with anyone in the Administration while they were in the Administration and that he never asked anyone to try to communicate a message to anyone in the Administration on any subject matter. … The evidence demonstrates that Manafort lied about his contacts. The evidence demonstrates that Manafort had contacts with Administration officials. For instance, in a text exchange from May 26, 2018, Manafort authorized a person to speak with an Administration official on Manafort’s behalf. Separately, according to another Manafort colleague, Manafort said in February of 2018 that Manafort had been in communication with a senior Administration official up through February 2018. A review of documents recovered from a search of Manafort’s electronic documents demonstrates additional contacts with Administration officials.